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Abstract
Biologists measure information in different ways. Neurobiologists and
researchers in bioinformatics often measure information using information-
theoretic measures such as Shannon’s entropy or mutual information. Be-
havioral biologists and evolutionary ecologists more commonly use decision-
theoretic measures, such the value of information, which assess the worth
of information to a decision maker. Here we show that these two kinds
of measures are intimately related in the context of biological evolution.
We present a simple model of evolution in an uncertain environment, and
calculate the increase in Darwinian fitness that is made possible by infor-
mation about the environmental state. This fitness increase — the fitness
value of information — is a composite of both Shannon’s mutual infor-
mation and the decision-theoretic value of information. Furthermore, we
show that in certain cases the fitness value of responding to a cue is exactly
equal to the mutual information between the cue and the environment. In
general the Shannon entropy of the environment, which seemingly fails to
take anything about organismal fitness into account, nonetheless imposes
an upper bound on the fitness value of information.
1 Introduction
Living organisms acquire, store, process, and transmit information — and as
such, information is a central organizing principle in biological systems at every
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scale from the digital coding in DNA to the long-range calls of cetaceans [1].
While information-theoretic measures such as entropy and mutual information
[2, 3, 4] have been embraced in neurobiology and bioinformatics, these measures
are less commonly used in behavioral biology and evolutionary ecology.
The problem is that entropy and mutual information do not directly address
information quality; they do not distinguish between relevant and irrelevant
information. Thus decision theorists, economists, and behavioral biologists typ-
ically measure information by considering its value: its effect on expected payoff
or expected fitness [5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10].
Definition: The value of information associated with a cue or signal
C is defined as the difference between the maximum expected payoff
or fitness that a decision-maker can obtain by conditioning on C
and the maximum expected payoff that could be obtained without
conditioning on C.
The disconnect between entropy and mutual information on one hand and
the value of information on the other has long puzzled biologists in general and
the authors of this paper in particular. Entropy and mutual information appear
to measure information quantity while reflecting nothing about fitness conse-
quences; the value of information measures fitness consequences but has nothing
to do with the actual length or information quantity of a message. But early
work in population genetics [11, 12, 13, 14]1 and recent analyses of evolution in
fluctuating environments [17, 18] hint at a possible relation between informa-
tion and fitness. What is this relation? Information theorists since Kelly [19]
have observed that in special circumstances, information value and information-
theoretic measures may be related. Here we argue that these special circum-
stances are exactly those about which biologists should be most concerned: the
context of evolution by natural selection. We address the question “how much
is information worth to living organisms?” and show that the answer turns out
to be a striking amalgam of mutual information and the decision-theoretic value
of information.
2 A basic model
As evolutionary biologists, how should we measure the cost of uncertainty2 or
the value of information? We want to know how the information affects fitness,
1Indeed, Claude Shannon wrote a PhD thesis in population genetics before embarking on
the work that launched the field of information theory [15, 16].
2Numerous studies in population ecology and genetics have shown that fitness and popu-
lation growth in uncertain environments depend on the exact nature of the uncertainty; they
depend both on the distribution of individual reproductive successes, and on the correlations
in individual successes (reviewed in ref. [20]). One can capture this complexity by distinguish-
ing between two types of uncertainty or risk [21]. Idiosyncratic risk is independent of that
faced by other individuals, whereas aggregate risk is perfectly correlated among individuals.
For example, predation imposes largely idiosyncratic risk on a herd of herbivores, whereas
drought imposes largely aggregate risk. In this paper, we focus exclusively on aggregate risk.
We will address mixed aggregate and idiosyncratic risk in a subsequent report.
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so the natural measure of the worth of information is the following: The fitness
value of information, G, is the greatest fitness decrement or cost that would be
favored by natural selection in exchange for the ability to attain the information.
Like stockbrokers and habitual gamblers, biological organisms faced with
uncertain conditions are selected to behave as if they are concerned with long-
term growth rates. Thus the fitness value of information to biological organisms
is best measured in terms of the consequences of this information on the long-
term growth rates of organismal lineages. Maximizing long-term growth in such
conditions is the same as maximizing the expected value of the logarithm of the
growth rate in a single generation [22, 23] (as opposed to the expected value of
the growth rate itself).
To illustrate these results and to develop an intuition about the value of
information in biological systems, consider the following simple model of a pop-
ulation of annual organisms living in a variable environment3. The state of the
environment in each year is an independent random variable Φ with two states
φ1 and φ2, that occur with probability p1, and p2 = 1 − p1 respectively. All
individuals encounter exactly the same environment in a given year. At the be-
ginning of its development, each organism makes an important developmental
decision to adopt one of two alternative phenotypes: one suited to environment
φ1, or one suited to φ2. The organism survives to reproduce only if its pheno-
type properly matches the demands of the current environment. The organism’s
fitness is given by the following matrix:
Phenotype 1 Phenotype 2
Environment φ1 w1 0
Environment φ2 0 w2
What should these individuals do in the absence of information about the
condition of the environment? In the short run, individuals maximize expected
fitness by employing the highest-payoff phenotype only. This yields an expected
single-generation fitness of max[p1 w1, p2 w2].
But in the long run, playing only one strategy will inevitably lead to a year
with zero fitness and consequent extinction. Thus natural selection will favor
not the short run maximization above, but rather a maximization of long-term
fitness. These organisms will be selected to hedge their bets during development
[24, 25], developing into phenotype 1 with some probability and phenotype
2 otherwise4. As we consider a larger and larger span of generations, natu-
ral selection is overwhelmingly likely [21] to favor the strategy that maximizes
the growth rate for “typical sequences” [4], in which environment φ1 occurs
N p1 times, and environment φ2 occurs N p2 times. For a genotype that de-
velops with probability x into phenotype 1, the population growth over such
3In this section, we follow Cover and Thomas’s (1991) presentation; these authors offer a
parable about a habitual gambler who perpetually reinvests his entire winnings at the horse
track. Their gambling story can be recast quite naturally as a model of organisms evolving
by natural selection to match their physiologies to uncertain environmental conditions.
4Alternatively, organisms can hedge their bets via phenotypic switching, as with the bac-
terial persistence phenotype [26, 27, 18].
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a sequence of N events will be (w1 x)
Np1 (w2(1 − x))
Np2 and will be maxi-
mized when N(p1 log(w1x)+p2 log(w2(1−x))) is maximized. This occurs when
p1/x = p2/(1 − x) or when x = p1. Thus for almost all sequences of envi-
ronments, the strategy that develops into phenotype 1 with probability p1 will
maximize the growth rate and thus take over the population. For this strategy,
the expected log growth rate will be p1 log(w1p1) + p2 log(w2p2).
We have set up a simple biological model where uncertainty critically affects
fitness. What is the fitness value of information here? Suppose that individuals
are able to detect a cue that they can use to forecast the state of the environ-
ment with 100% accuracy. In this case the organism will use phenotype 1 in
environment 1, and phenotype 2 in environment 2. What is the fitness value of
[being able to obtain] this cue?
First, we can look at how the cue improves the short-run expected fitness.
With the cue, individuals can always develop the appropriate phenotype for the
environment, and obtain short-run expected fitness p1w1 + p2w2. Thus in the
short run, the expected value of information is p1w1+p2w2−max[p1 w1, p2 w2] =
min[p1 w1, p2w2]. This is exactly the decision-theoretic value of information.
But natural selection will not maximize short run expected fitness; instead
as discussed above it maximizes the expected log fitness. Without the cue, the
expected log growth rate is Rno inf = p1 log(p1w1) + p2 log(p2w2). With the
cue it is Rinf = p1 logw1 + p2 logw2. The fitness value of information G is the
difference between growth with and without the cue, Rinf − Rno inf; and this
quantity is exactly the mutual information between the perfectly informative
cue and the environment, p1 log p1+p2 log p2. The payoffs wi have dropped out.
For this very simple example, the fitness value of information has nothing to
do with the fitnesses w1 and w2, but instead depends exclusively on the mutual
information measure.
This result generalizes naturally to cues that are only partially informative
[19, 4]. If the cue is a random variable C, the fitness value of information will
be the mutual information I(Φ;C) =
∑
φ,c p(φ, c) log
p(φ,c)
p(φ)p(c) between the cue C
and the state of the environment φ.
3 Two illustrative examples
Thus far we have been looking at a very special case in which the fitness of the
organism is zero when the wrong phenotype is adopted. A more realistic model
would allow the possibility of non-zero fitness even when the organism develops
to the wrong phenotype.
Example 1
We start with a two-environment, two-phenotype example. Since the players
have no control over the state of the environment, we can study the decision-
theoretic behavior of the players without loss of generality using the following
matrix where 1 > a ≥ b:
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Phenotype 1 Phenotype 2
Environment φ1 1 b
Environment φ2 a 1
If the organism invests x in phenotype 1 and 1 − x in phenotype 2, her
expected log growth rate will be p log[x + a(1 − x)] + (1 − p) log[b x+ (1− x)].
In the absence of information about which environmental state is realized, the
choice of x∗(p) that maximizes expected log growth given the probability p of
environment 1 is:
x∗(p) =


0 for p ≤ a(1−b)1−a b
p+a b(1−p)−a
(1−a)(1−b) for
a(1−b)
1−a b < p <
1−b
1−a b
1 for 1−b1−a b ≤ p
(1)
We see that the organism hedges bets only in a central region. Beyond
that region, the optimal bet-hedging strategy would require the organism to
produce one of the phenotypes with negative probability. This sort of investment
may be feasible in a stock market or a horse race, but negative bets seem to
lack a biological meaning. In biological situations, we do better to look at the
constrained case where the organism must produce each phenotype with non-
negative probability.
[ Figure 1 about here ]
If the organism responds to a cue C that gives the exact state of the environ-
ment, she will match her phenotype to the environment always, for an expected
log growth rate of log(1) = 0. The fitness value of information G is shown in fig-
ure 1. In the central region a(1−b)1−a b < p <
1−b
1−a b , the fitness value of information
is equal to the mutual information I(Φ;C) between the (perfectly informative)
cue C and the environment Φ, plus a linear function of the probability of each
environment. Outside the range, when the optimal strategy invests in only one
of the phenotypes, the value of the cue is −p log[a] or −(1−p) log[b]. This is sim-
ply the decision-theoretic log value of information, i.e., the expected log of the
value one would get if one took the decision-theoretic approach of maximizing
fitness in one generation.
Example 2
To get a better intuition of how the fitness value of information relates to the
evolutionarily optimal strategy in the absence of information, we move to the
case of 3 environments that occur with probabilities p1, p2, and p3 = (1−p1−p2).
While the principles generalize to larger numbers of environments and less-
symmetric payoffs, three symmetric environments are far easier to represent
graphically than are the more complicated alternatives. Thus we consider the
following payoffs structure where a > 1:
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0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
Prob. p
-0.4
-0.2
0.2
0.4
Value G
A
B
C
Figure 1: The fitness value of information (heavy solid curve) as a function
of environmental probabilities p is a composite of three value functions: Curve
(A) is the sum of mutual information between cue and environment and a linear
function of the environmental probabilities:−
(
p log[p] + (1 − p) log[1 − p]
)
−(
log[1−ab]− (1−p) log[1−a]−p log[1− b]
)
. Curves (B) and (C) are the linear
functions −p log[a] and −(1−p) log[b] respectively. Parameter values: a = 0.65,
b = 0.35. Simple calculus reveals that the despite being composed of a linear
component and a logarithmic component, the fitness value of information G is
not only continuous but also once continuously differentiable.
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Figure 2: Fractional investment in each strategy in order to maximize long-term
growth rate, as a function of the probabilities (p1, p2, p3) of each environment,
for example 2 with a = 2. Because of the constraint p1 + p2 + p3 = 1, we can
represent the space of all possible environment probabilities (p1, p2, p3) as the
two-dimensional simplex where one corner represents (1, 0, 0), another (0, 1, 0),
and the third (0, 0, 1). The height of the three surfaces at any point indicates
the fractional investment in each strategy at that point. On the left, we have
the unconstrained optimum, in which individuals may “bet against” certain
phenotypes, investing negatively in them and putting the suplus into the other
phenotypes. On the right is the constrained (and biological relevant) solution,
in which the fraction invested in each phenotype must be non-negative.
Phenotype 1 Phenotype 2 Phenotype 3
Env. φ1 a 1 1
Env. φ2 1 a 1
Env. φ3 1 1 a
Using the approach sketched out above, we can compute the fractional in-
vestment x1, x2, x3 in each strategy that maximizes long-term growth rate:
x1 = (p1(1 + a)− p2 − p3)/(a− 1)
x2 = (p2(1 + a)− p1 − p3)/(a− 1) (2)
x3 = (p3(1 + a)− p1 − p2)/(a− 1)
[ Figure 2 about here ]
This optimal strategy is shown in the left panel of Figure 2. Here we have
a curious sort of investment; the gray surface is the “invest zero” plane. When
the colored surfaces drop below this, the player is effectively betting against
those phenotypes by producing them with negative probability — which makes
7
no biological sense, as discussed above. Our solution is then only reasonable in
the central region where all three bets are non-negative. This area, which we
will call Region 1, is delimited by pi > 1/(2 + a) for all i = 1, 2, 3. Outside of
Region 1, we will have to compute optimal bets subject to constraints that no
bet is negative. We do this below and illustrate the result in the right panel of
Figure 2.
When one environment is sufficiently infrequent but the other two are com-
mon, an individual will invest in the phenotypes corresponding to the two com-
mon environments but not in the rare one. There are three such regions on
the simplex, with boundaries given by the trio of inequalities pi < 1/(2 + a),
pj < pka, and pk < pja. In these three areas which collectively we call Region
2, optimal allocation is given by
xi = 0
xj = (pja− pk)/(a− 1) (3)
xk = (pka− pj)/(a− 1)
Finally, when two environments are sufficiently rare, individuals will produce
only the phenotype corresponding to the common environment. This occurs
outside of the areas covered by Regions 1 and 2, in three corner areas which
collectively we call Region 3.
Because of the different betting strategies in each region, the value of in-
formation in each region is computed by a different formula. We take these in
turn. In Region 1, a cue indicating the state of the environment increases the
expected log growth rate by
log[a/(2 + a)]−
∑
pi log pi = log[a/(2 + a)] + I(Φ, C) (4)
This is simply a constant plus the mutual information between the environment
and the (perfectly informative) cue.
In Region 2, let l be the phenotype never adopted by the organism. Then
the cue increases the expected growth rate by
log a−
∑
i6=l
pi log pi − (1− pl) log[(1 + a)/(1− pl)] (5)
In Region 3, let l be the phenotype always adopted by the organism. The
cue increases the expected log growth rate by
(1− pl) log a (6)
This is simply the decision-theoretic log value of information, i.e., the log of the
value one would get if one took the decision-theoretic approach of maximizing
fitness in one generation.
Putting these all together, we get the surface shown in Figure 3.
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Figure 3: The fitness value of information G as a function of the probabilities
that each environment occurs, for the symmetric three-environment scenario
with a = 2, displayed on the simplex p1 + p2 + p3 = 1.
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[ Figure 3 about here ]
Surprisingly, this fitness value of information surface seamlessly sews to-
gether a region described by the mutual information (Region 1), a region de-
scribed by the decision-theoretic value of information (Region 3), and an inter-
mediate region (Region 2). Comparing the height of the surface and the gra-
dients along the relevant edge and point boundaries, calculus reveals that this
surface is again continuous and once continuously differentiable everywhere.
The fitness value of information incorporates both the information-theoretic
measure and the decision-theoretic value — and through the continuity of the
corresponding regions, we also see a fundamental connection between these two
measures.
4 Extending the model
Let us now assume that an organism has to make a developmental decision
between n possible phenotypes, each of which is a best match to one of n
environments. The environments φi occur with probabilities pi and the fitness
of phenotype j in environment i is wij .
How should an organism respond? To maximize short-run expected fitness,
the organism should simply develop the phenotype with the highest expected
fitness. Expected fitness then will be E[w] = maxj
[∑
i piwij
]
.
What about long-term fitness? We can find a general form for the fitness
value of information for those cases corresponding to Region 1 in the previous
example, i.e., where the organism develops into all n phenotypes with positive
probability. Let us look at a strategy that produces phenotype i with frequency
xi > 0. The organism will be selected to maximize the expected log growth
rate R, so we want to find the strategy that maximizes the log growth rate∑
i pi log
∑
j wijxj subject to the constraint that the fractional investments in
the various phenotypes sum to one:
∑
i xi = 1. The Lagrangian for this problem
is
L(x1, x2, . . . , xn, r) =
∑
i
pi log
∑
j
wijxj − λ
(∑
i
xi − 1
)
(7)
Since the constraint function is a linear function, it immediately satisfies
the constraint qualification that the partials of the constraint function at the
constrained maximizer are not all zero. We maximize the Lagrangian by taking
partial derivatives and setting to zero. The partials with respect to xk yield a
set of n equations:
∂
∂xk
[∑
i
pi log
∑
j
wijxj − λ
∑
i
xi] = 0 (8)
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Assuming that W (the matrix whose (i, j) entry is wij) is invertible, we can
write yi =
∑
j wijxj , and V =W
−1, so that xj =
∑
i vjiyi. Then we can solve
∂
∂yk
[∑
i
pi log
∑
j
yj − λ
∑
ij
vjiyi
]
= 0 (9)
for all k, which gives for all k:
pk
yk
− λ
∑
j
vjk = 0 (10)
Now we can solve for the constraint
∑
i xi = 1, which gives λ = 1 and
thus we have yk = pk/
∑
j vjk. Though this solution for yk always exists, and
the corresponding xi always satisfy the constraint
∑
i xi = 1, a solution might
contain negative xi, which would not be biologically plausible. Thus the rest of
the derivation will assume that we are in a region of parameter space in which
the solution is indeed non-negative for all xi. Substituting yk into the equation
for the log growth rate, to get the maximal log growth rate without the cue,
gives
Rno inf =
∑
i
pi log(
pi∑
j vji
) =
∑
i
pi log(pi)−
∑
i
pi log(
∑
j
vji) (11)
This expression is simply −H(Φ) + L(p), where H(Φ) is the entropy of the
environment and L is a linear function of the probabilities of each environmental
state.
We would now like to calculate the value of a cue. This will be the difference
in the expected log growth rate between this optimal strategy, and the optimal
strategy when a cue C is received.
First we consider a cue that reveals the exact environment. The organ-
ism will maximize fitness by matching phenotype to the known environment,
yielding a log growth rate Rinf =
∑
i pi log(wii). Thus the value of this cue is
J = Rinf −Rno inf = −
∑
i
pi log(pi) +
∑
i
pi log(wii
∑
j
vji) (12)
This is the mutual information between the (perfectly informative) cue and
environment, I(Φ;C) = H(p)− 0 plus a linear function of the probabilities pi.
Next we assume that the cue does not reveal the exact state of the envi-
ronment, but instead only contains partial information about the environment.
Let the mutual information between the cue C and the environment be I(Φ;C).
The strategy of the organism will depend on the cue. We can thus maximize
growth rate for each cue separately using the conditional probabilities of all
environments Pr(φ|c), and the same argument we used above to calculate the
optimal strategy. We used two assumptions there: first, that W is invertible,
and this still holds, and second that in our solution all xk are non-negative. We
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now assume that this is true for the responses to all cues, and limit the domain
of our solution correspondingly, as discussed below. We can then compute the
maximal growth rate by averaging equation 11 over all cues, for a maximal
growth rate of:
Rinf =
∑
c
Pr(c)
∑
φ
Pr(φ|c) log(Pr(φ|c)) −
∑
c
Pr(c)
∑
φ
Pr(φ|c) log(
∑
j
vji)
=
∑
c
∑
φ
Pr(φ, c) log(Pr(φ|c)) −
∑
i
pi log(
∑
j
vji) (13)
This is −H(Φ|C) + L(p), where H(Φ|C) is the conditional entropy of the
environment given the cue. The fitness value of information G conferred by the
cue is the difference in the growth rates: −H(Φ|C) + L(p) + H(Φ) − L(p) =
I(Φ;C). Thus G is simply the mutual information between the cue and the
environment.
Note that the fitness difference will be exactly I(Φ;C) only when the organ-
ism produces all phenotypes with positive probability both with and without the
cue. In our calculation we assumed that for all cues, all xi are positive. If the
environmental probabilities are such that the organism hedges in the absence of
a cue, then if the cue conveys sufficiently little information, the organism will
also do best to hedge after receiving the signal as well, albeit with different frac-
tions going into each phenotype. The reason is that for each particular signal c,
we get a solution using conditional probabilities Pr(φ|c) instead of the original
probabilities Pr(φ). If all the Pr(φ|c) are sufficiently close to Pr(φ), they will
fulfill the same requirements that Pr(φ) fulfills, and thus there will be a solution
with positive xi for each signal In all such cases, the fitness gained from a signal
will be exactly the mutual information between the signal and the environment.
When we are outside this range, the gain from a signal will be lower relative
to the mutual information, and can even be 0. For example, if without the
signal no bet-hedging occurs, and all signals convey so little information that
no decision is changed, then the gain in growth rate resulting from the signal
will be 0.
5 Bounding the fitness value of information
We can also show that the fitness value of information is bounded above by the
mutual information between cue and environment. Compare the expected log
growth rate of individuals of two types. Type A individuals receive a cue C
with possible values c1, c2, c3, . . . , cn drawn from a distribution with probability
function Pr(C) and entropy H(C). Each individual then maximizes expected
log growth rate by following some investment strategy s(c) that sets how to
invest in the various phenotypes, given the receipt of cue c.
Type B individuals do not receive this cue. Instead, they follow the betting
strategy r =
∑
c Pr(c)s(c), thereby employing a probability-matching mixture
of the various s(c) strategies used by Type A individuals.
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Represent the fitness of an individual using strategy s(y) when the cue was
c by w(s(y)|c). The expected log growth rate for Type A individuals is then
RA =
∑
c
Pr(c) log[w(s(c)|c)]. (14)
The expected log growth rate for Type B individuals is
RB =
∑
c
Pr(c) log
[∑
c′
Pr(c′)w(s(c′)|c)
]
. (15)
Since fitnesses are non-negative, the w(s(c′)|c) terms in the summation above
must be at least zero even for c′ 6= c, and therefore
∑′
c Pr(c
′)w(s(c′)|c) ≥
Pr(c)w(s(c)|c). Since log is a monotone function, this implies log
[∑′
c Pr(c
′)w(s(c′)|c)
]
≥
log
[
Pr(c)w(s(c)|c)
]
. Thus:
RB ≥
∑
c
Pr(c) log[Pr(c)w(s(c)|c)]
=
∑
c
Pr(c) log[w(s(c)|c)] +
∑
c
Pr(c) log Pr(c)
= RA −H(C). (16)
Since a growth rate of at least RB can be attained without information, the
fitness value of information is therefore bounded by G ≤ RA − RB < H(C) =
I(Φ, C) Thus the fitness value of information is at most equal to the mutual
information between a perfectly informative cue and the environment, irrespec-
tive of the actual fitness payoffs w. As before, this result can be generalized to
partially informative cues [4].
6 Discussion
In this paper we have shown that two measures of information, the information-
theoretic mutual information and the decision-theoretic value of information,
are united into a single measure when one looks at the strategies that natu-
ral selection will favor, namely those that maximize the long term growth rate
of biological organisms. Furthermore, we have shown that under conditions in
which bet-hedging is advantageous, and with cues that convey little informa-
tion, the fitness value of information associated with those cues is exactly the
mutual information between the cue and the environment. Finally, we have
shown that the fitness value of an informative cue is bounded above by the mu-
tual information between that cue and the environment, and in some cases is
equal to exactly this value. These results establish a close relationship between
biological fitness and information-theoretic measures such as entropy or mutual
information.
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But why does this relation exist? To answer that question, we should take
a closer look at the concept of information: information is the reduction of
uncertainty, where uncertainty measures the number of states a system might be
in. Thus mutual information between the world and a cue is the fold reduction in
uncertainly about the world after the cue is received. For example, if a system
could be in any of six equiprobable states, and a cue serves to narrow the
realm of possibility to just three of these, the cue provides a twofold reduction
in uncertainty. For reasons of convenience, information is measured as the
logarithm of the fold reduction in uncertainty — this ensures that the measure
is additive, so that for example we can add the information received by two
successive cues to calculate the total information gained [28, 29, 3].
Thus while information concepts are often thought to be linked with the fa-
mous sum
∑
p log(p), the fundamental concept is not a particular mathematical
formula. Rather, it is the notion that information measures the fold reduction
in uncertainty about the possible states of the world.
With this view, it is easy to see why information bears a close relation to bio-
logical fitness: For simplicity, consider an extreme example in which individuals
survive only if their phenotype matches the environment exactly, and suppose
that there are ten possible environments that occur with equal probability. In
the absence of any cue about the environment, the best the organism can do
is randomly choose one of the ten possible phenotypes with equal probability.
Only one tenth of the individuals will then survive, since only a tenth will match
the environment with their phenotype. If a cue conveys 1 bit of information and
thus reduces the uncertainty about the environment twofold, the environment
can be only in one of five possible states. The organism will now choose ran-
domly one of five possible phenotypes, and now a fifth of the population will
survive — a twofold increase in fitness, or a gain of 1 bit in the log of the growth
rate.
What happens when the environments are not equiprobable? In this case we
can understand the connection between information and fitness by looking to
long sequences of environments and the theory of typical sequences . The theory
tells us that almost surely one of the “typical sequences” — those sequences in
which the environments occur in their expected frequencies — will occur [4].
Moreover, all typical sequences occur with equal probability. Thus a lineage
is selected to divide its members equally among all typical sequences. Since
any one mistake in phenotype is lethal, only a fraction of these lineages, those
that have just the right sequence, will survive. The number of typical sequences
in this case is exactly 2NH(Φ) where N is the number of generations in the
sequence and H(Φ) is the entropy of the environment. Correspondingly, the
fraction of surviving lineages will be 2−NH(Φ) . If a cue C is received that
reduces the uncertainty of the environments by I(Φ;C), then the fraction of
surviving lineages can be increased by exactly 2NI(Φ;C). This is analogous to
the situation in communication: if we need to encode a string of symbols that
are not equiprobable, we turn to a long sequence of such symbols. Our code then
needs only to be efficient for representing typical sequences of symbols, and those
typical sequences occur with equal probability. The number of such sequences is
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2NH , where N is the length and H is the entropy of the symbols. If the message
recipient also obtains side information related to the message itself, then the
mutual information I(message; side information) measures the reduction in the
number of possible messages that need to be encoded by the transmitter. This
number of messages is reduced by exactly 2NI(message;side information)-fold by
the presence of the side information.
We can now see why the concept of information is the same across different
disciplines. In biology, fitness refers to the fold increase in the number of surviv-
ing lineages. In communication theory, information refers to the fold increase in
the number of messages to encode. In physics, entropy refers to the fold increase
in the number of possible states in phase space.
Finally, our results also suggest that information theory will be useful in
studying the evolution of communication. Even before knowing what a biologi-
cal signal means, how it is used, or what the fitness structure of the environment
may be, we have shown that one can place an upper bound on the fitness con-
sequences of responding to that signal, simply by measuring the information
content of the signalling channel.
15
Acknowledgments
This work was supported in part by a UW RRF award to CB and was initiated
during the authors’ visit to the H. R. Whiteley Center in Friday Harbor, WA.
The authors thank Sidney Frankel, Matina Donaldson and Arthur Robson for
their helpful discussions, and David Park for his help in producing the figures.
ML completed the early stages of this paper while at the Max Planck Institute
for Mathematics, which provided a very fruitful environment to work on such
questions.
References
[1] John Maynard Smith. The idea of information in biology. Quarterly Review
of Biology, 74(4):395–400, 1999.
[2] N. Wiener. Cybernetics. John Wiley and Sons, New York, 1948.
[3] C. E. Shannon. A mathematical theory of communication. Bell Systems
Technical Journal, 27:379–423; 623–656, 1948.
[4] T. M. Cover and J. A. Thomas. Elements of Information Theory. John
Wiley and Sons, New York, 1991.
[5] L. J. Savage. The Foundations of Statistics. Wiley, New York, 1954.
[6] I. J. Good. On the principle of total evidence. British Journal for the
Philosophy of Science, 17:319–321, 1966.
[7] J. P. Gould. Risk, stochastic preference, and the value of information.
Journal of Economic Theory, 8:64–84, 1974.
[8] D. W. Stephens and J. R. Krebs. Foraging Theory. Princeton University
Press, Princeton, 1986.
[9] D. W. Stephens. Variance and the value of information. American Natu-
ralist, 134(1):128–140, 1989.
[10] F. P Ramsey. Weight or value of knowledge. The British Journal for
the Philosophy of Science, 41:1–4, 1990). Published posthumously from
personal notes.
[11] J. B. S. Haldane. The cost of natural selection. Journal of Genetics,
55:511–524, 1957.
[12] M. Kimura. Natural selection as the process of accumulation of genetic
information in adaptive evolution. Genetical Research, 2:127–140, 1961.
[13] J. Felsenstein. Macroevolution in a model ecosystem. American Naturalist,
112:177–195, 1978.
16
[14] L. Demetrius. Statistical mechanics and population biology. Journal of
Statistical Physics, 30:709 – 753, 1983.
[15] C. E. Shannon. An algebra for theoretical genetics. In N. J. A. Sloane and
A. D. Wyner, editors, Claude Shannon: Collected Papers. John Wiley and
Sons, 1940. Ph.D dissertation, Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
[16] J. F. Crow. Shannon’s brief foray into genetics. Genetics, 159:915–917,
2001.
[17] C. T. Bergstrom and M. Lachmann. Shannon information and biological
fitness. In IEEE Information Theory Workshop 2004, pages 50–54. IEEE,
Oct. 2004.
[18] E. Kussell and S. Leibler. Phenotypic diversity, population growth, and
information in fluctuating environments. Science, 309:2075–2078, 2005.
[19] J. L. Kelly. A new interpretation of information rate. Bell Systems Tech-
nical Journal, 35:917–926, 1956.
[20] J. Yoshimura and V. A. A. Jansen. Evolution and population dynamics in
stochastic environments. Res. Popul. Ecol., 38(2):165–182, 1996.
[21] A. J. Robson, C. T. Bergstrom, and J. K. Pritchard. Risky business: Sexual
and asexual reproduction in variable environments. Journal of Theoretical
Biology, 197:541–556, 1999.
[22] D. Cohen. Optimizing reproduction in a randomly varying environment.
Journal of Theoretical Biology, 12:119–129, 1966.
[23] R. C. Lewontin and D. Cohen. On population growth in a randomly vary-
ing environment. Proceedings of the National Academy of the Sciences,
62:1056–1060, 1969.
[24] W. S. Cooper and R. H. Kaplan. Adaptive “coin-flipping”; a decision-
theoretic examination of natural selection for random individual variation.
Journal of Theoretical Biology, 94(94):135–151, 1982.
[25] Seger and Brockmann. What is bet-hedging? Oxford Surverys in Evolu-
tionary Biology, 4:182–211, 1987.
[26] M. Lachmann and E. Jablonka. The inheritance of phenotypes: an adap-
tation to fluctuating environments. Journal of Theoretical Biology, 81:1–9,
1996.
[27] E. Kussell, R. Kishony, N. Q. Balaban, and S. Leibler. Bacterial persistence:
A model of survival in changing environments. Genetics, 169:1807–1814,
2005.
[28] H. Nyquist. Certain factors affecting telegraph speed. Bell Systems Tech-
nical Journal, pages 324–346, 1924.
17
[29] R. V. Hartley. Transmission of information. Bell Systems Technical Jour-
nal, 7:535–563, 1928.
18
